A leading defense analyst has cautioned that the United States could deplete its stockpile of critical long range missiles within about a week if a major conflict with China breaks out especially in a war over Taiwan.
In his new book, “The American Edge,” security expert Seth Jones describes the U.S. China rivalry as the most significant strategic contest in American history. Speaking with Fox News Digital, Jones warned that the U.S. industrial base is still far behind China’s rapidly expanding wartime level production capacity.
Jones, a former Pentagon official and head of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), argues that China’s economic and military growth far surpasses what the U.S. faced during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China’s economy rivals the size of America’s and is deeply integrated into global manufacturing a foundation that fuels its massive military buildup.
According to Jones, China now produces fifth- and sixth-generation aircraft, advanced missile systems, and operates a shipbuilding industry that he estimates is over 200 times larger than that of the United States. “The gap is shrinking,” he warned.
Production, Not Innovation, May Decide a Long War
Jones stresses that great powers historically win prolonged wars through industrial output the ability to build weapons quickly and in large quantities. This is where he believes the U.S. is at greatest risk.
China’s growing missile forces are designed to keep U.S. ships and aircraft at a distance, making American munitions stockpiles vitally important. “When you look at the current numbers, the U.S. would run out of long-range munitions after roughly a week of conflict over Taiwan,” he said. “That’s not enough to sustain a protracted war.”
Despite China’s strengths, Jones highlig
Where the U.S. Still Has an Edge
hts a key weakness in Beijing’s arsenal: anti-submarine warfare. He notes that China “still can’t see well undersea,” giving the U.S. a major advantage with attack submarines and emerging unmanned underwater vehicles both crucial in any Taiwan scenario.
China also struggles with corruption inside the PLA, inefficient state-owned defense companies, weak joint operations, limited power projection beyond the first island chain, and a force that hasn’t fought a war since the 1970s. Still, Jones argues these issues don’t negate China’s overwhelming production advantage.
The Pentagon’s Slow Machinery
Jones describes the U.S. defense industrial base as constrained by outdated shipyards, long acquisition processes, and contracting systems not built for a modern great-power competition. He insists the U.S. must revive the kind of industrial urgency seen in past wartime eras.
He acknowledges that the Trump administration has pushed the Pentagon to accelerate development of drones, munitions, and maritime platforms. New rapid-acquisition offices have been launched across the military branches, and senior officials increasingly talk about shifting to a “wartime footing.”
But Jones says progress is slow: “The Pentagon is a massive bureaucracy. Breaking it is like trench warfare.”
Spending, Shipyards & AI: What Must Change
Jones notes the proposed defense bill includes meaningful steps, such as prioritizing key munitions and strengthening the shipbuilding workforce. He believes the U.S. may also need to rely more on allied shipyards in Japan and South Korea to relieve pressure on American facilities.
He warns that current defense spending about 3% of GDP is lower than during the Cold War and likely insufficient to match China’s pace.
Artificial intelligence is another major battleground. Jones argues that modern air defense and intelligence systems depend on AI due to the speed and scale of threats. To keep up, he says the Pentagon must integrate commercial tech companies like Nvidia and Google into national security efforts.
The Final Warning
Despite the challenges, Jones believes the U.S. can still regain its industrial advantage but only if it acts urgently.